

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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SAM-01 EUR-25 NEA-11 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04

AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /166 W  
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P R 071909Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1528

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 1078

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING 6 FEB 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: CONSENSUS OF GROUP WAS THAT TONE AND CONTENTS OF SOVIET STATEMENT OF FEB 5 AND FACT OF RAPID LEAKAGE OF SUBSTANCE TO PRESS SHOWED HARDENING OF SOVIET POSITION. SOME SAW HINT OF FLEXIBILITY IN PARA ASKING ALLIED TO INDICATE WHEN AND BY HOW MUCH THEY INTENDED TO REDUCE. GROUP APPROVED DRAFT PLENARY STATEMENT ON COMMON CEILING PENDING POSSIBLE RESOLUTION OF U.S. OBJECTIONS TO PASSAGE CONTRASTING WESTERN FORCE STABILITY WITH EASTERN INCREASES IN RECENT YEARS. GROUP AGREED DEFER THIS PLENARY STATEMENT AND MAKE NO STATEMENT

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ON 12 FEB. GROUP REVISED CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT TO SATISFY

ITALIAN REP'S REQUEST TO NOTE THAT ALLIED REPS TO SOVIET-AGREED INFORMAL MULTILATERAL MEETINGS SPOKE ON BEHALF OF WHOLE AGH AND TO DELETE LIST OF PLENARY PRESENTATIONS DUE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON SEQUENCE. GROUP CONCLUDED BY AGREEING TO GREEK AND TURKISH SUGGESTION THAT FLANK SECURITY ISSUE BE ENHANCED BY INCLUDING IT AT OUTSET OF STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES. END SUMMARY

2. CHAIRMAN (BEHREND) ASKED GROUP FOR REPORTS ON BILATERALS. US REP CIRCULATED REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH POLISH REP STRULAK (SEE SEPTEL) STRESSING THAT ESSENCE WAS CONTAINED IN PARA 9, WHICH INDICATED THAT POLES DID NOT RESIST TWO-PHASE APPROACH PROVIDED THAT THEY RECEIVED THE CLARIFICATIONS IN WHICH THEY WERE INTERESTED. THE POLES WERE CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF FORCE INCREASES BY NON-US FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES AND FAVORED A FORCE FREEZE BETWEEN PHASES. US REP SAID HE THOUGHT POLES WOULD GO ALONG WITH TWO PHASES, BUT WARNED THAT POLISH ACQUIESCENCE DID NOT NECESSARILY INDICATE ANYTHING ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIETS WHOSE POSITION WAS DECISIVE.

PLENARY STATEMENT BY SOVIET REP ON 5 FEBRUARY.

3. CHAIRMAN NOTED THAT KHLESTOV IN FEB 5 PLENARY MADE TWO MAJOR POINTS: UNWILLINGNESS OF EUROPEAN ALLIED TO REDUCE WHILE THE US APPEARED WILLING, AND NECESSITY FOR INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. FRG REP FELT THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA WHERE KHLESTOV ASKED ALLIED TO INDICATE WHEN AND HOW MUCH THEY INTENDED TO REDUCE MIGHT HINT AT READINESS TO ACCEPT PHASING IF THE EAST RECEIVED THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES. CHAIRMAN CALLED ATTENTION OF GROUP TO FACT THAT ACCOUNTS OF THE KHLESTOV STATEMENT HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS ON THE SAME AFTERNOON AS DELIVERED AND THAT THIS STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT IT HAD BEEN LEAKED. CHAIRMAN NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE BOTH HARD AND SOFT ELEMENTS IN THE STATEMENT. GREEK REP (DOUNTAS) ALSO CALLED ATTENTION TO PARA WHICH INVITES ALLIES TO GIVE SOME INDICATION OF WHEN AND BY HOW MUCH THEY ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE. HE BELIEVED PARA WAS A HINT THAT THE EAST WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MODALITIES OF REDUCTION.

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4. ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI) DEMURRED, NOTING THAT IN EARLIER PARA KHLESTOV INSISTS THAT ALL ELEVEN STATES PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. ITALIAN REP SAID THAT FACT THAT SOVIET SIDE HAD PROVIDED A DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE STATEMENT WITHIN AN HOUR, EVEN BEFORE THE ALLIES HAD COMPLETED THEIR TRANSLATION, WAS IN ITSELF AN INDICATION OF THE HARDENING OF THE EASTERN POSITION.

HE CALLED ATTENTION OF GROUP ALSO TO THE FACT THAT THE PRESS ACCOUNTS WERE HARSHER THAN THE STATEMENT ITSELF. HE WONDERED WHY THE RUSSIANS WISHED AT THIS TIME TO MAKE SUCH HARSH PROPAGANDA.

5. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) AGREED WITH ITALIAN REP ON HARSH TONE OF STATEMENT, AS DID UK REP, WHO SAW NO FLEXIBILITY ON EITHER OF THE MAIN SOVIET OBJECTIVES--REDUCTION FROM THE BEGINNING OF NATIONAL FORCES, AND INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. HE NOTED ALSO THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT HAD CONTRASTED THE STATEMENT OF THE US REP OF US WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF SUCH STATEMENTS ON THE PART OF EUROPEAN STATES. SURELY KHLESTOV KNOWS THAT ALL ALLIED SPEAKERS ARE SPEAKING FOR THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE, OBSERVED THE UK REP, SO THIS WAS AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO SOW DISSENSION IN THE ALLIED RANKS. KHLESTOV HAD BEEN UNYIELDING ON THE SECOND POINT: NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES, BUT HIS ARGUMENTS WERE WEAK. KHLESTOV HAD QUOTED UK STATEMENT OF 31 JAN WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT SAID NOTHING ON COMMON CEILING, WHICH WAS THE MAIN SUBJECT OF UK REP'S STATEMENT, CONTINUING EASTERN HABIT OF NOT CRITICIZING OR EVEN MENTIONING COMMON CEILING.

6. CANADIAN REP (GRANDE) AGREED UK REP'S PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT KHLESTOV WAS TRYING TO DIVIDE THE ALLIES BY CONTRASTING US REP'S STATEMENT WITH ABSENCE OF SIMILAR STATEMENTS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES, AND ADDED THAT THIS WAS A WELL-KNOWN WARSAW PACT TACTIC. IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME IT HAD BEEN USED IN PLENARY. CANADIAN REP ADDED THAT HE DOUBTED THAT KHLESTOV WOULD USE A PUBLICIZED STATEMENT TO REVEAL FLEXIBILITY. KHLESTOV COULD ALWAYS DENY WHAT SOME OF THE ALLIES BELIEVE TO BE THE MEANING OF PARA 15.

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P R 071909Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1529

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

7. BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN) SAID HE WAS SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT. ONE HARD ASPECT WAS THE HANDING OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT TO THE PRESS EVEN BEFORE THE PLENARY- BELGIAN REP NOTED THAT BRUSSELS HAD CALLED HIM AT 2 P.. FEB 5 TO SAY IT WAS ALREADY ON THE TICKET. FURTHERMORE, THE PRESS WAS INTERPRETING IT AS A HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION, WHICH IT WOULD HARDLY DO UNLESS THE SOVIETS, ALMOST CERTAINLY THE SOURCE OF THE STORY, HAD NOT SO INTENDED. HOWEVER, BELGIAN REP ADDED, THE SOVIETS OFTEN ADOPT A HARD LINE IN PUBLIC IN THE EARLY PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. PERHAPS THE STATEMENT WAS A PREPARATION FOR A MORE OPEN APPROACH IN THE PLANNED INFORMAL SESSION.

8. BELGIAN REP WAS ALSO ENCOURAGED BY WHAT HE SAW AS A SOVIET SHIFT AWAY FROM OBJECTIONS IN PRINCIPLE TO TECHNICAL  
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OBJECTIONS. IN CRITICIZING WESTERN FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE, KHLESTOV DID NOT REFER TO THE PRINCIPLE OF HISTORICALLY ESTABLISHED EQUILIBRIUM, AS SOVIETS HAD USUALLY DONE, BUT BASED HIS ARGUMENT ON THE ALLEGED USE BY THE WEST OF OBSOLETE MILITARY THEORIES. NOTING THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE STATEMENT MENTIONED BY OTHER ALLIED REPS, HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REMARKS BY POLISH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER BISZTYGA IN LONDON AND SOVIET STATEMENTS TO THE US REP LAST WEEK, SOVIETS MIGHT BE MERELY

SLOWING DOWN TO WAIT FOR NEW INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.

9. US DEP REP SAID THAT ALTHOUGH SOVIET STATEMENT AS WELL AS PRESS LEAK MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS ATTEMPT TO DRIVE WEDGE BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES, HE THOUGHT THEIR ARGUEMENT AND PRUPOSE VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD--THEY SIMPLY WANTED TO CONTRAST THE US STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO REUDCE WITH THE ABSENCE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN STATEMENTS ON THIS SCORE IN ORDER TO BOLSTER THEIR ARGUEMENT THAT THE EUROPEANS SHOULD TAKE A POSITIVE POSITION. WITH REGARD TO THE FLEXIBILITY HINTED IN PARA CITED BY OTHER REPS-- IT RECALLED STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET DELOFF KVITSINSKIY TO FRG REP THAT IF THE WEST WAS INTERESTED IN PHASES, THE RUSSIANS WANT A PACKAGE WITH THE DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT LATER. HE DID NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIETS WERE WILLING AS YET TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THEIR POSITION OR THAT SPEECH WAS SIGNAL IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER.

10. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE SOVIET STATEMENT WAS HARD OR SOFT. THE TASK OF THE GROUP WAS TO FOLLOW UP ON WHATEVER POSSIBILITIES SEEMED TO EXIST-- SUCH AS PARA CITED BY OTHER REPS-- TO SEE IF THEY LEAD SOMEWHERE. CANADIAN REP AGREED, AS DID UK REP, WHO ALSO THOUGHT THAT PARA SHOULD BE EXPLORED.

11. CANADIAN REP THEN RAISED QUESTION WHETHER ALLIES SHOULD PROTEST THE SOVIET ISSUANCE OF SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET STATEMENT TO PRESS. THIS SUGGESTION SUPPORTED BY UK, ITALIAN, AND FRG REPS.

PROPOSED PLENARY STATEMENT ON COMMON CEILING:

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12. US REP SAID US DELEGATION HAD TO CONTINUE RESERVE ON STATEMENT CONCERNING INCREASE IN SOVIET FORCES. HE SUGGESTED PRESENTATION BE POSTPONED IN VIEW OF THE INTEREST OF SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP IN CLARIFYING SITUATION PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF STATEMENT AND DESIRE OF ALLIES TO GO INTO ONE PLENARY A WEEK SCHEDULE. CANADIAN REP SAID HE HAD NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROVE STATEMENT, NOW DRAFTED. HE TOO FAVORED DELAYING THE PLENARY. GROUP AGREED TO INFORM EAST THAT THE NEXT ALLIED PRESENTATION WOULD BE ON FEB 12.

13. US REP, CITING DRAFT TEXT'S REBUTTAL OF SOVIET FEARS OF EUROPEAN FORCE INCREASES BETWEEN PHASES, ARGUED THAT THE LANGUAGE WAS TOO WEAK TO COUNTER THE SOVIET ARGUMENT. IF THE QUESTION COULD NOT BE ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY NOW, WHY RAISE IT IN TEXT. THIS WAS

UNDERSTANDABLE SOVIET CONCERN, HE ADDED, AND IF THE ALLIES COULD NOT REBUT IT EFFECTIVELY, THEY SHOULD NOT REFER TO THE ISSUE AT ALL. IF THEY DO DECIDE TO RAISE IT, THEY CAN SAY THAT COUNTRIES ARE UNLIKELY TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IF THEY MUST AGAIN REDUCE THEM TO A LOWER LEVEL IN PHASE II. OTHERWISE ALLIES ARE SUPPORTING SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FREEZE BETWEEN SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FREEZE BETWEEN PHASES WITHOUT ANSWERING IT. FRG DEP REP NOTED THAT THE ALLIES WERE MERELY ASKING SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT, RPT CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING, AND NOT A SPECIFIC CEILING.

THIS COULD IN THEORY LEAVE SOME ROOM FOR INCREASES IN OTHER FORCES THAN US, AND THE DRAFT STATEMENT HAD DELIBERTELY LEFT THIS POINT OBSCURE. NETHERLANDS REP REPEATED HIS EARLIER URGING THAT ALLIES POINT OUT TO THE EASTERN SIDE THAT IN AGREEING TO THE WORDING OF THE JUN 28 COMMUNIQUE THAY HAD NOT ASSUMED THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE AS ALLEGED BY KHLESTOV IN HIS PARA 7, WHERE HE STATES THAT THE POINT OF THE DEFINITION OF THE STATUS OF VARIOUS STATES IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS WAS THAT ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE AGREEMENT MUST REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THE AGREED AREA. US DEP REP OBJECTED THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE AT THIS TIME TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT, HOWEVER JUSTIFIED,

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TO THE EAST, SINCE TO DO SO NOW WOULD ONLY GIVE THEM FURTHER SUPPORT FOR THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE TRYING TO EVADE REDUCTIONS. NETHERLANDS REP AGREED THAT THE ARGUMENTATION OF THE SRAFT PLENARY STATEMENT FAILED TO DEAL WITH EASTERN FEARS THAT US WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE OFFSET BY INCREASES IN NATIONAL FORCES, SUCH AS BUNDESWEHR, TO SAY NOTHING OF OTHER ARMS WHICH MIGHT BE DEALT WITH UNDER NON-CIRCUMVENTION, ALTHOUGH WITH DIFFICULTY. IF THE FRENCH WITHDREW, THE ALLIES COULD INCREASE AND BE WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING. FRG REP NOTED THAT GROUP HAD NO AGREED ALLIED DOCTRINE ON THIS QUESTION AND HENCE COULD NOT SPEAK TO IT AT THIS TIME. ITALIAN REP OBJECTED

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

THAT TEXT CHARGES EASTERN SIDE WITH IMPUTING INTENTION  
OF COMPENSATING FORCE INCREASES WHEN EASTERN SIDE HAD  
MADE SUCH CHARGES ONLY IN BILATERALS.

14. AFTER A NUMBER OF MINOR TEXTUAL IMPROVEMENTS,  
GROUP APPROVED DRAFT PLENARY STATEMENT EXCEPT FOR  
PASSAGE BRACKETED BY AMERICAN DELEGATION.

15. REPORT OF MILITARY SUBGROUP: FRG DELOFF GENERAL  
STIEFF GAVE BRIEF REPORT ON SUBGROUP DISCUSSIONS OF  
DATA PROBLEMS AND NEED FOR FURTHER WORK, ESPECIALLY  
ON THE MEANING OF "AUTHORIZED PEACETIME MANNING LEVELS"  
AND POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES AMONG MODE OF REPORTING NATO GROUND FORCES.  
HE SAID THAT PROBLEM OF DATA BASE COULD BE ADDRESSED  
BY NATO SGDS COL BRANSON AND THAT MESSAGE SHOULD NOT BE SENT  
TO NATO BEFORE THE MEETING WITH COL. BRANSON.

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16. CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT. AD HOC GROUP APPROVED FOR  
FORWARDING TO NATO CHAIRMAN'S WEEKLY REPORT FOR  
28 JANUARY TO 3 FEBRUARY. SOME CHANGES WERE MADE IN

THE ORIGINAL DRAFT AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE PRESENT CHAIRMAN SUPPORTED BY CANADA. IT WAS DECIDED TO DELETE A TENTATIVE LIST OF ADDITIONAL PLENARY PRESENTATIONS SINCE THE GROUP WAS NOT RPT NOT AGREED ON WHETHER ALL ITEMS SHOULD BE INCLUDED OR ON THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN. PARA 2 WAS REVISED TO OVERCOME OBJECTIONS BY ITALIAN REP THAT ORIGINAL DRAFT, WHICH MENTIONED SOVIET REJECTION OF EMISSARIES AND PREFERENCE FOR SMALL SOCIAL GATHERINGS, DID NOT SPECIFY THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE "SOCIAL" GATHERINGS FINALLY AGREED UPON WOULD REPRESENT THE AHG AND NOT JUST THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS, AS IN THE CASE OF BILATERALS.

17 STABILIZING MEASURES AND FLANK SECURITY. UK REP NOTED THAT HE HAD PROPOSED ONE PLENARY STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES AND A SECOND ON FLANK SECURITY, AND THAT HIS HAD BEEN AGREED PROVISIONALLY PENDING RECEIPT OF MATERIAL ON STABILIZING MEASURES WHICH WAS NOW DELAYED. IF THE ALLIES SPOKE ON 21 FEB ON STABILIZING MEASURES THEY WILL NOT HAVE RECEIVED IN TIME THE MATERIAL FROM NATO WHICH WAS ASKED FOR IT ONLY ON 20 FEB. ALLIES WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO MAKE AT LEAST TWO STATEMENTS ON STABILIZING MEASURES -- ONE MORE GENERAL WITHOUT THE MATERIAL AND A LATER ONE INCLUDING IT. TURKISH DEP REP SAID HE WOULD PREFER THAT STATEMENT ON FLANK SECURITY BE PRESENTED ALONG WITH STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES AND BY A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. GREEK REP AGREED. ITALIAN REP THOUGHT, HOWEVER, THAT DUE TO ITS IMPORTANCE, FLANK SECURITY SUBJECT SHOULD NOT BE MIXED WITH STABILIZING MEASURES. GREEK REP OBJECTED THAT THERE WAS NOT YET SUFFICIENT MATERIAL ON FLANK SECURITY FOR A SEPARATE STATEMENT, AND NOTED THAT TOPIC HAD ALWAYS BEEN LINKED WITH STABILIZING MEASURES. SUPPORTED BY TURKISH DELEGATION, HE THOUGHT ISSUE OF FLANK SECURITY WOULD BE RAISED IN IMPORTANCE PRECISELY BY RELATING IT TO STABILIZING MEASURES. THIS WAS AGREED. THE DRAFTING GROUP WAS INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE AN OUTLINE OF  
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STATEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES.

18. NEXT AHG MEETING IS TO BE HELD 7 FEBRUARY.HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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